Chapter 3: Parliament’s influential role in making and changing laws in the Brexit legislation process
Despite findings that Parliament’s influence on Brexit legislation was shaped and largely limited by the executive’s increased use of delegated powers during the uncertainty of Brexit, there is evidence to suggest that Parliament enjoyed some influence during the proposed timeframe. During and after the defined timeframe, we see a pattern of academic literature alleging that Parliament exercised an ‘unusual influence’[1] at the expense of the minority government standing during the 2017 – 2019 parliamentary session.[2] Lynch and Whitaker support this view – they argue that this political scope offered the UK parliament ‘a greater influence’[3] than the long-established influence it enjoys under the traditional majority-working government structure.[4] Its influence can be deciphered in its consideration of Brexit legislation, notably that of the final EUWA 2018 Bill.[5] It can be discerned in three recurring themes – It held a considerable role exerting significant pressure.[6] It underlaid most substantive amendments of legislation and in Louise Thompson’s terms, created ‘gridlock and inertia’[7] in delaying the Brexit procedure through its scrutiny of legislation.[8]
The February 2020 Commons Briefing paper, asserted that ‘several’[9] sections of the EUWA 2018 bill were a result of parliamentary influence.[10] Whilst the primary focus of the Act was to prepare domestic law for the prospect of a no-deal exit, the 2020 Commons Briefing paper argues that the legislature also exploited this opportunity to influence negotiations between the EU and UK government and the resultant legislative procedure.[11] Jack S. Caird added that the legislature has shown considerable ‘ingenuity and determination’[12] in its proposals that persuaded the government to change its positions and constrain government proposals in the legislative process.[13] The legislature achieved a ‘proactive role’[14] after successfully creating a “meaningful vote” legal framework in Section 13 of the EUWA 2018. This meant that it had a significant vote in approval of any Withdrawal Agreement or lack thereof, in the event of a withdrawal agreement not being reached. [15] Moreover, parliamentary amendments sought to constrain or see clarity on government proposals for future areas to be covered by retained EU law.[16] For example, Section 16 of the EUWA 2018 required the executive to publish the draft environmental principles and governance bill within 6 months of royal assent by late December 2018.[17] The House of Lords inserted Section 19 of EUWA 2018 at the report stage as a declaratory provision, providing that there was nothing in the EUWA 2018 to stop the UK from replicating EU law in domestic law made on or after exit day.[18] Comparably, parliamentary amendments to Section 18 of the EUWA 2018, also imposed a reporting requirement on the Government at the end of October 2018. Consequently, Dominic Raab, the Secretary of State, at the time, made a report defining the government’s position on the specific custom arrangement it was seeking to secure as a result. Therefore, showing some Parliamentary involvement in the making of Brexit legislation. [19]
Nevertheless, Fleming highlights the executive’s control of the Parliament agenda limiting parliamentary impact – most legislation is introduced to Parliament by the executive which largely controls to agenda and time of the Commons. [20] However, the executive chooses to abandon legislation rather than see it amended in ways that they dislike.[21] [22] They explicitly intended to avoid visible conflict – he points out that the parliamentary influence here is ‘hard to detect’[23] but we can see the validity of this view from the legislation that Parliament was ‘allowed’[24] to consider and the ‘unusually large’ quantity of Brexit legislation that parliament ‘did not fully consider.’[25] Fleming asserted that it is not ‘unheard of’[26] for governments to pause or withdraw legislation in the face of parliamentary opposition.[27] However, Fleming convincingly highlights that this large number of delayed Brexit legislation reflects government concern about the risk of heavy parliamentary amendments to its Brexit legislation.[28] For instance, only six out of the eleven Brexit Bills introduced under Theresa May and two under Boris Johnson during the 2017 and 2019 parliamentary sessions were passed.[29] This suggests that the executive faced difficulty in progressing their Brexit-related legislative agendas – Fleming highlights that two bills were stalled by the Commons’ second reading, four reached the Commons committee stage but never got to the report stage and one passed through both the Commons and Lords, namely the Trade Bill but that it was never scheduled for the Commons to consider the Lords’ changes.[30] Five of the delayed bills were introduced by May’s government – and they were delayed for between six to ten months.[31] Fleming highlights little government and media attention on the lack of progress of these bills but the opposition MPs did – he uses Labour’s Thangam Debbonaire as an example who notably asked the Leader of the House about ‘the location of missing pieces of legislation’ in June 2019.[32] Whilst the executive’s choice to not propose legislation to Parliament can be interpreted to reflect the power of the executive, the discussed evidence of delays to Brexit bills equally shows the extent and influence of the parliamentary branch influence on Brexit legislation through its scrutiny mechanisms. Delays in this case are shown to have occurred out of anticipation of parliamentary power to scrutinise it suggesting the significant role of Parliament in Brexit legislature and that the executive was not entirely in control.[33]
Rosalind English also importantly indicated that Parliament could not have intended for its legislative sovereignty to be entirely usurped by executive ministers.[34] She draws from accounts of important constitutional figures, namely Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, the former President of the UK Supreme Court between 2012 and 2017, who asserted that it is ‘likely’[35] that Parliament’s use of general phrasing and words in Brexit delegated powers was intentional. [36] English suggested that the general phrasing of Henry VIII powers in Bills of the parliamentary session 2017 – 2019 and the EU (WA) 2020 ‘do not necessarily assist the executive.’[37] The legislative branches will not anticipate the executive to exercise the delegated power within the literal meanings of the words, suggesting that we can assume that the Houses anticipated the executive to interpret the wide meaning of delegated powers as they thought fit. [38] Parliament intentionally chose to delegate powers during the Article 50 time-period with the uncertain status of the Withdrawal Agreement as it was practical. This supports Fleming’s assertion that Parliament sustained a ‘powerful role’[39] – it exercised the prerogatives of its legislative authority and had the power to delegate parts of its law-making responsibilities to the executive. [40] However, Neuberger cautioned Parliament’s delegation of powers to the executive – he pointed out that Parliament subsequently retains ‘very little more than, in reality, nominal control.’[41] Caird’s hypothesis of a ‘Commons having power without influence’[42] thus carries more weight – it is clear that Parliament retains its power as sovereign to delegate controls to other constitutional bodies but this is purely a formality after the delegation of these powers and it has limited influence over their implementation as discussed in the application of powers. [43]
Conclusion
It is clear from this study that Parliamentary sovereignty and the legislature’s role in Brexit legislative procedure is complex and as Fleming concluded, ‘nuanced.’[44] Its problematic nature is rightfully scrutinised and debated by different audiences. The opposing arguments that Fleming presents, arguing the influence of Parliament and that the parliamentary scrutiny procedure was not effective during the defined 2017 – 2020 timeframe represent this.[45]
However, its complexity must be placed in the uncertain context of Brexit and the significant constitutional implications of leaving the European Union. This study identifies two crucial transformative phases that effected the legislative procedure, the ratification of the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 and the negotiated European Union Withdrawal Agreement of 2019 under Johnson’s government resulting in the eventual ratification of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. It is clear that during the 2017 – 2019 parliamentary session, there is some evidence of parliamentary influence in the legislative process. We can see that there were substantive sections of the EUWA amended by parliamentary groups and the clear delays construed by parliamentary pressure preventing the ratification of a Withdrawal Agreement. Lynch, further argued in a nuanced point, that parliament maintains its authority by intentionally delegating powers to the executive.[46] However, ‘the powerful’[47] role of parliament that Fleming promotes, is too ambitious in this context as the delegation of legislation to other bodies prevents parliamentary influence after the delegated powers have been implemented – raising further concerning issues of parliamentary accountability and the limitations of parliamentary capacity to ensure that the executive is held to account for its law-making policies in the Brexit legislation process. Notably, this time-period was marked by a minority standing government – the executive was as Fleming outlined, clearly ‘vulnerable to defeat’[48] therefore, arguments that suggest that parliament exerted more influence on the legislation process than in the normal circumstances of a majority government are convincing. This is especially convincing in the assessment of delays to Brexit bills during the outlined time-frame – six bills out of eleven bills introduced reinforce this. Thus suggesting the nuanced nature of parliament influence – it suggests elements of success and limitations to asserting its scrutiny mechanisms.
The second part of the essay is characterised by an evaluation of parliamentary scrutiny of the increased use of delegated powers during the discussed time-frame. Our analysis shows some evidence of cooperation between the parliamentary recommendations and the executive during the 2017 – 2019 parliamentary session. However, the limited cooperation concerning the Withdrawal Agreement Act 2020 is reflective of a new-founded executive majority under Johnson that was more dominant in legislative decision-making. Through the evaluation of parliamentary committee reports and scrutiny of relevant Brexit bills during the defined time-period, we can effectively assess the extent to which parliament assesses the Brexit legislature. The use of delegated powers was prevalent during the period, and this is widely expressed in literature – however, existing scholarship’s way of assessing this existing substantive evidence to justify these claims is limited there is little mention of Parliament’s internal mechanisms and the extent at which they effectively performed scrutiny of this proposed Brexit legislation. Thus the analysis and drawing from parliamentary committee commentaries is especially important – we see a theme of increased use and the problematic recurring content of Brexit legislation through the analysis of skeleton Bills, Henry VIII powers and obscure drafting language. This is problematic in the context of parliamentary democracy scrutinising government legislation on behalf of the electorate – parliamentary critics and the LSCC notably outline their concern that this delegation of power to the executive and limitation of parliamentary scrutiny destabilises the separation of powers that are essential to the UK constitution. However, as voiced by Brexit legislature critics, the context of the fast-paced and restricted time period of Brexit called for their usage with the uncertainty of the constitutional changes and status of the UK Constitution with its departure from the European Union. On the other hand, the Lords’ LSCC and the DPRRC convincingly asserted that this use of powers was ‘inappropriate’[49] and that it should have been devised by primary legislation. These assertions are proven by the analysis of the Brexit Bills contents – it is clear that the powers provided, particularly in the Trade Bill 2019, which proposed a delegation of powers to the executive to create an appropriate body which should have been allocated to primary legislative procedure. Moreover, we see that institutionally, the Lord’s legislative branches are better equipped to scrutinise delegated policy than the Commons with the DPRRC and Constitution committees and that safeguards should have been used more in Brexit legislative procedure.
Overall, this assessment has established and evaluated existing argumentation from respective parliamentary and investigation bodies as well as individual experts who have commented extensively on the discussed the Brexit legislative procedure. This short overview shows the nuanced nature of parliamentary scrutiny and its influence during 2017 – 2020. The influence of the executive and that parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms are shaped by the political scope of executive standing in Parliament. In turn we see that there is a need to improve legislative procedure to address the imbalanced checks and balances between the essential executive and legislative institutions of the UK constitution. This involved the use of delegated powers through the use of safeguards and introducing representative committees in the Commons to improve executive accountability to parliament and address the discussed deficiencies of parliamentary scrutiny holding the executive to account in Brexit legislative procedure by improving cooperation between the executive and parliamentary branches.
This article is not intended to be taken as legal advice or acted upon. If you require further advice in this area, please contact our team of Solicitors.
[1] Tom Fleming, Lisa James, ‘How far did parliament influence Brexit legislation’ (The Constitution Unit, 10 October 2022) <https://constitution-unit.com/2022/10/10/how-far-did-parliament-influence-brexit-legislation/> accessed 10 July 2023.
[2] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 1.
[3] Phillip Lynch, Richard Whitaker, ‘Select Committees and Brexit: Parliamentary Influence in a decisive policy area’ (2020) ES/R000646/1 Economic and Social Research Council Brexit Priority Grant 3.
[4] Phillip Lynch, Richard Whitaker, ‘Select Committees and Brexit: Parliamentary Influence in a decisive policy area’ (2020) ES/R000646/1 Economic and Social Research Council Brexit Priority Grant 3.
[5] Tom Fleming, Lisa James, ‘How far did parliament influence Brexit legislation’ (The Constitution Unit, 10 October 2022) <https://constitution-unit.com/2022/10/10/how-far-did-parliament-influence-brexit-legislation/> accessed 10 July 2023.
[6] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 18.
[7] Jonathon Tonge, Stuart Wilks Heeg, Louise Thompson, Britain Votes: The 2019 General Election (Oxford, 2020) 61.
[8] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 17-18.
[9] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 14.
[10] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 14.
[11] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 14.
[12] Jack S Caird, ‘Does the House of Commons have power without influence?’ (LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, 9 April 2019) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/04/09/does-the-house-of-commons-have-power-without-influence/> accessed 19 August 2023.
[13] Jack S Caird, ‘Does the House of Commons have power without influence?’ (LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, 9 April 2019) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/04/09/does-the-house-of-commons-have-power-without-influence/> accessed 19 August 2023.
[14] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 14.
[15] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 15.
[16] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 15.
[17] V Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 15.
[18] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 15.
[19] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 2023 15.
[20] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 6.
[21] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 7.
[22] The Constitution Society ‘The Constitution Explained: The executive’ The Constitution Society (London, 2023) <https://consoc.org.uk/the-constitution-explained/the-executive/> accessed 21 July 2023.
[23] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 7.
[24] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 17.
[25] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 17.
[26] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 7.
[27] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 7.
[28] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 7.
[29] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 8.
[30] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 15.
[31] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 15.
[32] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 15.
[33] Graeme C Sylvia de Mars, Richard Kelly, David Torrance, ‘Constitutional implications of the Withdrawal Agreement legislation’ (2020) 08805 House of Commons Library <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8805/CBP-8805.pdf> accessed 15 July 7.
[34] Rosalind English, ‘Henry VIII power v Parliament’ Counsel (Sutton, September 2021) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/henry-viii-powers-v-parliament> accessed 10 July 2023.
[35] Rosalind English, ‘Henry VIII power v Parliament’ Counsel (Sutton, September 2021) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/henry-viii-powers-v-parliament> accessed 10 July 2023.
[36] Rosalind English, ‘Henry VIII power v Parliament’ Counsel (Sutton, September 2021) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/henry-viii-powers-v-parliament> accessed 10 July 2023.
[37] Rosalind English, ‘Henry VIII power v Parliament’ Counsel (Sutton, September 2021) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/henry-viii-powers-v-parliament> accessed 10 July 2023.
[38] Rosalind English, ‘Henry VIII power v Parliament’ Counsel (Sutton, September 2021) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/henry-viii-powers-v-parliament> accessed 10 July 2023.
[39] Martin Stanley, ‘Henry VIII Powers’ (UK Regulation, 2016) <https://www.regulation.org.uk/deregulation-henry_viii_powers.html> accessed 17 July 2023.
[40] Martin Stanley, ‘Henry VIII Powers’ (UK Regulation, 2016) <https://www.regulation.org.uk/deregulation-henry_viii_powers.html> accessed 17 July 2023.
[41] Martin Stanley, ‘Henry VIII Powers’ (UK Regulation, 2016) <https://www.regulation.org.uk/deregulation-henry_viii_powers.html> accessed 17 July 2023.
[42] Jack S Caird, ‘Does the House of Commons have power without influence?’ (LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, 9 April 2019) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/04/09/does-the-house-of-commons-have-power-without-influence/> accessed 19 August 2023.
[43] Martin Stanley, ‘Henry VIII Powers’ (UK Regulation, 2016) <https://www.regulation.org.uk/deregulation-henry_viii_powers.html> accessed 17 July 2023.
[44] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 18.
[45] Thomas G Fleming, Tasneem Ghazi, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation: Lessons from Comparative Experience’ (2023) Political Quarterly <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13290> accessed 10 August 2023 1-2.
[46] Rosalind English, ‘Henry VIII power v Parliament’ Counsel (Sutton, September 2021) <https://www.counselmagazine.co.uk/articles/henry-viii-powers-v-parliament> accessed 10 July 2023.
[47] Thomas G Fleming, Tasneem Ghazi, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation: Lessons from Comparative Experience’ (2023) Political Quarterly <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13290> accessed 10 August 2023 1-2.
[48] Thomas G Fleming, Lisa James, ‘Parliamentary Influence on Brexit Legislation, 2017–2019’ (2022) Parliamentary Affairs 4.
[49] Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, ‘Fisheries Bill Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL] Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Bill’ (2018) 39Th Report UK Parliament <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/lddelreg/226/226.pdf> accessed 10 July 2023 paras 10 & 13.